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INTRODUCTION
Special committees of corporate boards of directors make some of the
most important decisions facing the corporation - often related to crucial
transactions or litigation and sometimes involving ethical implications for the
board of directors. High-quality decision-making on these issues is even more
urgent in this time of economic volatility and outrage about corporate
irresponsibility. Indeed, special committees may be increasingly in the
spotlight as the current economic crisis will likely lead to a flood of
shareholder litigation and, when credit markets thaw, a wave of strategic
transactions. Although special committees consisting of only one member are
not the norm, sometimes a special committee of just one person bears the
responsibility of handling the entire matter.1 This may be due to a board's
lack of additional independent directors to put on a committee, and desire to
avoid hiring a new director, or because of an oversight or failure to appreciate
the value of having multiple members. It is imperative that this practice be
examined because the size of the committee may significantly affect the
quality of decisions that are so crucial to the corporation.
Recent scholarship has examined group decision-making in corporate
governance and has made the case that group decision-making, such as
corporate boards engage in, is on average superior to individual decision-
making. 2 Indeed, there is a host of research showing that groups making
decisions tend to perform better than individuals, including outperforming
individuals when solving problems that require analysis and evaluation such
as corporate directors engage in.3 Case law has highlighted the need for more
attention to the quality of decision-making by special committees of corporate
boards. In light of the research on group decision-making, this need suggests
that there be more focus on the number of directors participating in a special
committee. Delaware courts, whose decisions are formative in the corporate
1 See Gesoff v. IIC Indus. Inc., 902 A.2d 1130, 1146 (Del. Ch. 2006) (characterizing the
circumstances in which special committees are comprised of only one member as "rare").
2 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why A Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002); see also Robert J. Haft, Business Decisions by the
New Board: Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1, 50-67 (1981);
Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms and the
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L. J. 797 (2001);
Note, The Propriety of Judicial Deference to Corporate Boards of Directors, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1894, 1896-97 (1983).
3 See Bainbridge, supra note 2; see also Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social
Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 530-31
(2002) (citing Bainbridge and Gayle W. Hill, Group Versus Individual Performance: Are
N+I Heads Better Than One?, 91 PSYCHOL. BULL. 517, 533 (1982)).
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law setting, have recognized the advantages and wisdom of having multiple
members on special committees.4
This Article proposes a rule that encourages or explicitly requires
special committees to consist of more than one member. Even in the absence
of a formal change in corporate law on this matter, this is a structural step that
boards should take to improve the quality of decisions that special committees
make and to increase the perceived strength and legitimacy of their decisions.
These recommendations make sense in light of the experimental data and
longstanding recognition that decisions made by groups are on average
superior to those made individually, as well as in light of the perceived
legitimacy that decisions made by groups hold as opposed to decisions made
by a single unmonitored ruler.5  Critically, the existing studies on group
decision-making bear only limited resemblance to the type of activities in
which directors on special committees engage. The studies are generally
laboratory experiments involving non-directors performing problem solving
and decision-making tasks substantively unrelated to the corporate context.
Yet special committees make crucial decisions for corporations and their
optimal size and group processes are ripe areas for researchers to make
valuable contributions. Therefore, in addition to proposing a rule for
multiple-member special committees, this Article also calls out for new, more
targeted empirical studies in the special committee context.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. As a starting point, Part I of this
Article examines the important purpose and function that special committees
serve when a corporate board is confronted with decisions that create a real or
perceived conflict of interest for certain corporate directors. This background
on special committees underscores the centrality of decision-making to their
purpose and the importance of optimizing the decisions they make. With this
foundation set out, Part II analyzes the literature on group decision-making,
drawing on studies from other disciplines and legal scholarship on corporate
governance. This Part of the Article seeks to add to the literature on group
decision-making in the corporate governance context by exploring another
4 See Gesoff, 902 A.2d at 1146.
5 See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of
Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 170 (2004) ("While the historical and political origins of
the corporate board of directors provide conflicting evidence regarding the various purposes
modem commentators claim for the board, these origins suggest a critical function which
modem commentators seem to have overlooked. This function is providing political
legitimacy."). For an example of informal recognition of the superiority of group decision-
making, see MAm J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 238 (Princeton Univ. Press 1996) ("[A] single individual
will do worse than a network of decisionmaking, which reduces error, similar to the way that
the members of a good law firm with many high-quality people in overlapping fields can
cooperate, converse, and get the job done better than a lawyer of equal quality working
alone.").
Ed. 2]
UC Davis Business Law Journal
logical source - negotiation theory - that also supports using a multi-member
group for decision-making and negotiation. Part III of this Article discusses
recent Delaware case law reflecting a judicial preference for special
committees with multiple members. These cases show that courts, in
reviewing the actions of special committees, at least implicitly recognize the
rationale of having committees with more than one director. In Part IV, this
Article recommends that more be done to firmly establish a preference for
committees with multiple members and responds to potential concerns the
proposal may raise. Finally, Part V briefly concludes by highlighting key
points and areas for future study.
I. PURPOSE AND FUNCTION OF SPECIAL COMMITTEES
The context in which special committees operate shows that decision-
making is one of their central activities and underscores the importance of
optimizing their decisions. As a basic matter, corporate statutes provide that a
corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of its board of
directors, which is composed of directors elected by the shareholders and who
act together to make decisions. 6 The board's role is commonly described as
monitoring and disciplining the executive management, formulating policies,
and making decisions for the corporation to maximize shareholder or firm
value.7 The historic rule and prevailing norm is that corporate boards consist
of more than one director, although it is not generally required.8
6 See Gevurtz, supra note 5, at 92-94. Professor Gevurtz asserts that the origins of corporate
boards provide some support for Bainbridge's argument that the rationale for having a board
is the superiority of group decision-making. See id. at 167. Gevurtz explains that town
councils, guild councils, parliaments and early trading company boards adjudicated disputes,
reflecting the idea that groups are more likely to get the correct result than an individual
judge. He notes that medieval parliaments had a tradition of consultation and consensus that
seemingly arose from the concept of the feudal obligation of nobles to provide advice to the
king. "Underlying the obligation to provide advice must be some notion of the superiority of
groups over individuals in making decisions." Id. at 168.
7 See Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 5, 8; see also Sanjai Bhagat & Dennis C. Carey, Director
Ownership, Corporate Performance, and Management Turnover, 54 Bus. LAW. 885, 891
(1999) ("The primary responsibility of the corporate board of directors is to engage, monitor,
and, when necessary, replace company management"); 18B Am. Jur. 2D Corporations §§
1483-1491 (1985) (noting responsibilities of directors); Douglas G. Baird and M. Todd
Henderson, Other People's Money, 60 STANFORD L. REv. 1309 (2008) (critically examining
the conception of directors' duties).
8 See Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 42; see also, e.g., Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.03 cmt. 1
(2002) (Before 1969 the Model Act required three or more directors to serve on a corporate
board); Edwin J. Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation - The Need for More
and Improved Legislation, 54 GEO. L.J. 1145, 1151 (1966). Single-person corporate boards
have been allowed more recently. See Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.03 (2002); Cal. Corp. Code
§ 212(a) (1990) (permitting a corporate board to have less than three board members if the
[Vol. 9
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Boards typically form special committees when confronted with the
special situation of making a decision or carrying out a negotiation in which
certain directors have a real or perceived conflict of interest. 9 The board then
vests authority in the special committee to resolve the sensitive matter.
10
Forming such special committees serves an important purpose because,
depending on the type of transaction at hand, a special committee composed
of disinterested directors can serve to protect the interests of the corporation's
shareholders and can help board members properly carry out their fiduciary
duties.
Examples of common situations in which special committees are
necessary also highlight the important decision-making and negotiation
functions they perform. Consider a private equity deal where a corporation's
executive team would typically seek to continue to manage the corporation
after a proposed merger. The team might hold an equity stake and stock
options designed to encourage them to increase the value placed on the
corporation in a merger. If these team members also serve on the board of
directors, they may have a conflict between their own interests and the
corporation's non-management shareholders who are being cashed out. For
example, the interested directors might be satisfied with an offer that would
keep the management team in place and consequentially they might fail to
pursue the highest value for the corporation's shareholders by engaging in an
active search for strategic buyers. One way to deal with the conflict posed by
the interested directors, particularly where they form a majority of the board,
would be to prevent them from negotiating the prospective merger and instead
have a special committee serve this function for the board." The special
committee would thus step into the shoes of the board to negotiate and make a
corporation has less than three shareholders).
9 Generally state law employs the term "disinterested director" to refer to a director who does
not have a conflict of interest in a particular transaction. Courts must engage in a fact specific
inquiry to determine a director's disinterestedness because it varies depending on the
transaction at issue. See Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32
DEL. J. CoRP. L. 73 (2007); see also Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 144; Model Bus. Corp. Act §
8.3 1(a)(3)(2005). Although the terms "disinterested director" and "independent director" can
be conceptually distinguished from each other, this Article follows common practice and uses
the terms interchangeably. See Clarke at 74-76, 104-05 (explaining distinctions between the
various manifestations of the term "independent director," including "disinterested director");
Gesoff, 902 A.2d at 1145-46 ("Members of a special committee negotiating a parent-
subsidiary merger must, of course, be independent and willing to perform their job. This is
the sine qua non of the entire negotiation process.").
10 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141 (e) (2009) (recognizing the board's authority to
delegate authority to a committee of the board).
1 The special committee should be formed at an appropriately early stage to handle the
matter at issue. Once formed, the special committee must gather information and deliberate
without the interested directors and seek sufficient, independent legal and financial advice.
See, e.g., In re Netsmart Tech., Inc. S'holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 193 (Del. Ch. 2007).
Ed. 2]
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decision regarding the proposed transaction. This process should keep the
interested directors effectively quarantined with respect to the transaction.
Boards also often use special committees to handle conflicts of interest
posed by transactions involving a controlling shareholder or when selling
control of the corporation. Courts apply varying levels of scrutiny to the
board's use of a special committee depending on the factual scenario and type
of transaction at issue. For example, where the board decides to sell the
corporation for cash, the board members typically assume a fiduciary duty to
undertake reasonable efforts to secure the highest price realistically
achievable. 12 This duty requires the board to act reasonably by engaging in a
logically sound process to get the best deal attainable. 13  Unlike the bare
rationality standard applicable to common, garden-variety business decisions,
the standard applicable where the heightened duty is triggered - often called a
Revlon duty - involves a judicial examination of the reasonableness of the
board's decision-making process. 14  "[T]his reasonableness review is more
searching than rationality review, and there is less tolerance for slack by the
directors. Although the directors have a choice of means, they do not comply
with their Revlon duties unless they undertake reasonable steps to get the best
deal.' 5 An important way to set the stage for taking those reasonable steps is
often for the board to form a special committee to handle the transaction. The
disinterestedness of the directors on the special committee demonstrates the
board's intention for the special committee to engage in arm's length
negotiation to get the best deal.
Another example of a situation in which the special committee
framework is often used is a freezeout merger or going private transaction
such as in the well-known Delaware case, Weinberger v. U.O.P. Inc., 457
A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). In Weinberger, the Delaware Supreme Court subjected
the transaction to a level of scrutiny known as "entire fairness," which is
higher than the business judgment standard. This includes a judicial review
for fair price and fair dealing, which encompasses a review of the disclosures
12 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 n.16
(Del. 1986) ("The directors' role remains an active one, changed only in the respect that they
are charged with the duty of selling the company at the highest price attainable for the
stockholders' benefit."); Paramount Comm'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44
(Del. 1994) ("In the sale of control context, the directors must focus on one primary objective
- to secure the transaction offering the best value reasonably available for the stockholders -
and they must exercise their fiduciary duties to further that end.").
13 See, e.g., QVC, 637 A.2d at 45 ("[A] court applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be
deciding whether the directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision. If a board
selected one of several reasonable alternatives, a court should not second-guess that choice
even though it might have decided otherwise or subsequent events may have cast doubt on the
board's determination.").
14 See QVC, 637 A.2d at 45.
15 In re Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 192.
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made as well as procedural issues such as timing, negotiation and structure. 16
The court found the transaction did not meet the entire fairness standard, but
suggested that it may have found differently had the board used a committee
of independent directors acting at arm's length.17 The idea was that a special
committee would allow the board to replicate the type of arm's length
negotiation that would occur if a disinterested board was negotiating a buyout.
Since Weinberger, in situations where a majority shareholder seeks to acquire
the remaining shares of the corporation through a merger, a board will
typically form a committee of the independent directors to consider and
negotiate the merger. Under Delaware law, in freezeout and other control
transactions, if the board forms a special committee that is properly composed
and follows proper procedure then the burden of proof may shift to the
complaining shareholder. 18 This can be a significant advantage for directors
in litigation.
16 See Weinberger v. U.O.P. Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del. 1983). Other states have
followed various aspects of the Delaware approach, whereas some courts have disagreed with
Delaware and retained a business purpose test. See, e.g., Stringer v. Car Data Sys., Inc., 841
P.2d 1183 (Or. 1992) (following Weinberger by using a variety of financial valuations in
determining fair price and noting that appraisal may be the exclusive remedy if there is
unlawful conduct such as self-dealing, fraud, deliberate waste or misrepresentation); Coggins
v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1112 (Mass. 1986) (applying a
business purpose test of fairness in freezeout mergers before looking at fairness); Alpert v. 28
Williams Street Corp., 63 N.Y. 2d 557 (N.Y. 1984) (requiring that the transaction have a valid
business purpose in addition to subjecting the transaction to an entire fairness review).
17 Specifically, the court stated:
Although perfection is not possible, or expected, the result here could have
been entirely different if UOP had appointed an independent negotiating
committee of its outside directors to deal with Signal at arm's length. Since
fairness in this context can be equated to conduct by a theoretical, wholly
independent, board of directors acting upon the matter before them, it is
unfortunate that this course apparently was neither considered nor pursued.
Particularly in a parent-subsidiary context, a showing that the action taken
was as though each of the contending parties had in fact exerted its
bargaining power against the other at arm's length is strong evidence that
the transaction meets the test of fairness.
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709 n.7 (internal citations omitted).
18 See Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) (refining the rule
established in Weinberger by holding that approval by an acquiree special committee did not
obviate the entire fairness review, but did shift the burden of proof from the acquirer to the
challenging shareholders); see also In re Pure Resources, Inc. S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421
(Del. Ch. 2002) (holding the entire fairness standard applies to merger transactions, not tender
offers). The special committee members must be independent, informed and active
participants in the committee's deliberations, as well as simulate an arm's length negotiation.
See Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997). State law varies on this burden-
shifting point and on freezeout and going private transactions generally. See supra, note 16.
Ed. 2]
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Finally, special committees are commonly formed in response to a
shareholder derivative lawsuit. Known as a special litigation committee or
"SLC," this particular type of special committee has its roots in the 1970's
when a number of U.S. corporations and their representatives made
questionable payments. 19  With a crowded docket of these cases, the
Securities and Exchange Commission instituted a voluntary compliance
program to handle them efficiently. Under the program, corporations that
investigated their own matters, made disclosures, and developed procedures
for handling possible illegal payments, would receive a less severe
punishment than the Commission might have otherwise imposed.
Corporations quickly developed the mechanism of using a committee of
outside directors, assisted by independent legal counsel, to take advantage of
the voluntary compliance program. Shortly thereafter, corporations applied
the same technique in response to shareholder derivative lawsuits.
20
Typically, the board would assign the committee of disinterested and often
recently appointed directors 21 the task of investigating the charges and
preparing a report recommending whether the lawsuit should proceed. Often
an outside advisor, such as special counsel that did not otherwise represent the
corporation, would assist the SLC. The use of such SLCs gained popularity in
the 1980's, particularly with the takeover boom of that era. In the vast
majority of cases, SLCs recommended dismissing the lawsuits. Courts have
responded to SLCs with varying levels of scrutiny.
22
19 Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural Bias, Special Litigation Committees, and the Vagaries of
Director Independence, 90 IowA L. REV. 1305, n.181 (2005); see also Arthur Matthews,
Internal Corporate Investigations, 45 OIO ST. L.J. 655, 666-70 (1984) (describing the
development of SLCs).
20 See Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (an early case involving a SLC
in which the court dismissed the derivative suit after the board formed a SLC which
investigated the lawsuit and concluded that it was not in the best interests of the corporation
or its shareholders to maintain the lawsuit).
21 Typically, SLCs would consist of two or three directors. Under the Model Business
Corporation Act (MBCA), an SLC of at least two independent directors may seek dismissal of
derivative litigation after a shareholder has made the obligatory pre-lawsuit demand. MBCA
§ 7.44(a). Delaware law does not have a requirement that an SLC be constituted of more than
one director, however in Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del. Ch. 1985), the court noted
that "[i]f a single member committee is to be used, the member should, like Caesar's wife, be
above reproach." In that case, the court refused to follow the SLC's recommendation to
dismiss the lawsuit pending against Fuqua Industries' senior management because the sole
director on the SLC had ties to Fuqua Industries - a $10 million dollar gift the company
gave to Duke's Business School when the director was president of Duke University. Id.
22 See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979) (holding a SLC's
recommendation to dismiss litigation was entitled to judicial deference under the business
judgment doctrine unless the plaintiff showed the committee's members were interested or
had not acted on an informed basis); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981)
(establishing a two-part inquiry applicable in demand-excused cases, involving procedural
[Vol. 9
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The foregoing examples illustrate the context and critical nature of the
decision-making and negotiation tasks that corporate boards tend to assign to
special committees. Given the importance of these tasks, improving the
committees' decisions may directly translate into value for the corporation in
terms of better deals and fewer costly lawsuits.23 Better deals may result
because both group decision-making research and negotiation theory show
that decisions made by groups tend on average to be superior to those made by
individuals, and teams have advantages in negotiations. 24  Fewer costly
lawsuits are another likely result because some courts have already signaled
their preference for multiple-member committees.25  Single-member special
committees could become a magnet for lawsuits and courts could subject their
decisions to a higher level of scrutiny.
II. STUDIES AND LITERATURE ON GROUP DECISION-MAKING AND
APPLICATION TO SPECIAL COMMITTEES
This Article continues the work of other scholars who have drawn on
studies in law and other disciplines to support arguments based on the premise
that groups generally outperform individuals. Group decision-making has
long been an area of study in the law and in certain other fields law such as
behavioral economics and psychology.26 For instance, scholars studying the
merits of the jury system have used the data on group decision-making for
27some time. Notably, the judiciary has taken express notice of this empirical
and scholarly work, particularly in the context of reviewing challenges to
and substantive review, to determine whether a SLC's recommendation to dismiss would be
respected); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) (limiting Zapata by making demand
a requirement in many cases).
23 In addition to potentially negative publicity from shareholder lawsuits and the distraction
and stress they bring to corporate directors, lawsuit costs arise in the form of legal fees,
settlement costs, and perhaps higher costs for director and officer liability insurance. See
Bernard Black, Brian Cheffims & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 Stan. L.
Rev. 1055, 1099 (2006). It is generally the corporation itself that bears the brunt of these
costs because outside directors rarely pay "out-of-pocket" for liability in shareholder suits.
See id. at 1059-60.
24 See infra Part II.
25 See infra Part III.
26 See infra, Part II.a. Also outside legal scholarship, but widely influential, is Kenneth
Arrow's work on group decision-making. See KENNETH J. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
INDIVIDUAL VALUES (John Wiley 2d ed., 1963); see also MANCUR OLSON, TIE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOVERNMENT AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (Harvard
University Press 1965); NORMAN SCHOFIELD, COLLECTIVE DECISIONMAKING: SOCIAL
CHOICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY (Springer 1996).
27 See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232 n.10 (1978) (listing a survey of scholarly work
on jury size); see also Michael J. Saks, Book Review: Blaming the Jury, 75 GEO. L.J. 693,
706-07 (1986) (reviewing Valerie P. Hans & Neil Widmar's JUDGING THE JURY (1986)).
Ed. 2]
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reduced jury size.28 The Supreme Court has even applied specific data from
empirical studies on group decision-making in the context of challenges to
jury size, with a sharp focus on the consistency and reliability of groups with
fewer than six members.
29
More recently, legal scholarship has successfully drawn upon the
studies and literature on group decision-making in the context of corporate
governance. Most notably in that area, scholars have used experimental data
showing the superiority of group decision-making to explain why a board of
directors, as opposed to an individual decision-maker, sits atop the corporate
hierarchy.30
In addition to the corporate governance literature drawing upon the
group decision-making studies, negotiation scholars have long argued that
teams have advantages in negotiations. This insight could apply in the
corporate governance context because decisions made by groups such as
special committees inherently involve activities that are analogous to
negotiation processes, and special committees also commonly engage in
external formal negotiation.
This part summarizes and explains why such studies and literature
provide insights into possible improvements for the structure of special
committees. These studies and literature on group decision-making then
provide the basis for recommendations concerning special committees, set
forth in Part IV.
A. Multidisciplinary Studies on Group Decision-Making
As a general matter, studies on group decision-making have repeatedly
shown the superiority of group performance over the average individual
performance.31
21 See Ballew, 435 U.S. at 224-28 (holding that "the five-member jury d[id] not satisfy the
jury trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, as applied to the States through the
Fourteenth"). In Ballew, the Supreme Court applied the principles enunciated in Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), which upheld the use of a six-person jury in a state criminal trial,
but examined the empirical data available post- Williams and concluded that such data raised
"significant doubts about the consistency and reliability of the decisions of smaller juries."
See Ballew, 435 U.S. at 235. The Ballew Court noted specific empirical studies showing
several key points about how size relates to group performance: (1) "[g]enerally, a positive
correlation exists between group size and the quality of both group performance and group
productivity"; (2) "[t]he smaller the group, the less likely are members to make critical
contributions necessary for the solution of a given problem"; (3) "the smaller the group, the
less likely it is to overcome the biases of its members to obtain an accurate result." Id. at 232-
33.
29 See id at 235, 239.
30 See Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 54-55.
31 Although this is largely accepted as a general matter, some qualifications to this statement
are necessary because of the wide variety of tasks and ways of measuring performance. See
[Vol. 9
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1. Summary of Key Studies
Research examining individual versus group performance dates back
over a hundred years. 32 The tasks and structures of the early studies bear little
resemblance to the type of decision-making that directors engage in, but the
research formed the basis of later studies that have involved increasingly
comparable tasks and structures. The very first social psychology experiment
dates to the late nineteenth century and its focus was on the fundamental
question of whether the presence of another person improves or hinders
individual performance on a task.33 Specifically, the experiment tested
whether an individual competing against another person would complete a
simple laboratory task faster than when completing the task alone. The study
showed that people usually worked faster when competing than when doing
the task alone. Similar experiments followed in the early 1900'S.
34
One researcher then devised a laboratory task that removed the
competitive element from the experiment and tested whether individuals
carried out cognitive tasks better in groups or alone.35 The results of this
study quickly led to much more experimentation and refinement of
explanatory theories about group performance. 36 Psychologist Marjorie E.
Shaw's study from the 1930's was one of the most notable of these early
experiments on group performance.37 In Shaw's study, students solved
Rupert Brown, GROUP PROCESSES 221 (2d ed. 2001); ANTONY S. R. MANSTEAD & MILES
HEWSTONE, THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 272-75 (1996). For
example, a group may outperform an individual, but the group may perform less well than
would be predicted by taking the sum of its individual members' potential performances.
This is easily imaginable: a group pulling on a rope might pull more weight than an
individual, but the total weight pulled by the group might be less than each member's
potential due to coordination losses or social loafing. Similarly, groups may outperform the
average individual at solving problems in a study, but once the data is "statisticized" it could
show that this is due to the groups simply benefiting from increasing their chances of having
one member amongst them who can solve the problems. In other words, groups may
outperform individuals but the differences may in some instances be due to the benefits
inherent in having greater numbers.
32 See Brown, supra note 31, at 169.
33 See id (citing N. Triplett, The dynamogenic factors in pacemaking and competition, 9 AM.
J. PSYCHOL. 507-33 (1898) (involving the task of winding fishing reels)).
34 See id. (citing Allport, 1924; Dashiell, 1930; Moede, 1920-1). "Coactors or a passive
audience tend to improve performance of a well-learned or easy task, but impede performance
of a poorly learned or difficult task. In general, however, groups are interactive entities, and
the question becomes one of whether the task is better accomplished by interaction in a group,
or simply by individuals working alone." See Manstead, supra note 31, at 271-72.
35 See Brown, supra note 31, at 169-70 (citing F.H. ALLPORT, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
(Houghton Mifflin 1924)).
36 See id.
37 See Marjorie E. Shaw, A Comparison of Individuals and Small Groups in the Rational
Solution of Complex Problems, 44 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 491, 492-504 (1932); see also
Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 12-13 (discussing study by Shaw); Brown, supra note 31, at 174-
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various reasoning problems. Half of the students worked as members of
random four-person groups whereas the other half of the students worked
alone. A higher proportion of the groups were able to solve the problems than
the individuals.
Psychologist D.I. Marquart replicated Shaw's study in 1955 using
similar problems.38 Like Shaw, Marquart again showed that groups were
more likely to solve the problems. However, Marquart used the data to make
different comparisons between the individuals and groups than Shaw had
earlier. Marquart randomly combined the individuals into "nominal" or
hypothetical groups and analyzed how many of these "statisticized" groups
would have solved the problems - i.e., how many of these hypothetical groups
contained an individual who had individually solved the problems. She found
no difference between the performances of the hypothetical groups and the
real interacting groups. 39  This suggested that groups outperformed
individuals, but that groups tended to perform better simply because their
numbers increased their chances of having a member who could solve the
problems.
In the 1980's, Professor Frederick C. Miner, Jr., a professor of
management, conducted another notable experiment that showed that groups
outperformed the average individual subject. 40 However, the study also
revealed that groups tended to be less accurate than the best decision-maker
within each group. Miner's study used 69 self-selected groups of four
undergraduate business students who shared the single goal of correctly
solving the "winter survival exercise." The exercise required study
participants to decide questions faced by hypothetical airplane crash survivors
in a remote location, such as whether to stay or leave the crash site, and how
to rank the utility of 15 survival aids. This study perhaps came closer to
replicating corporate governance by using business students who shared a
single goal when performing as a group. Directors, at least theoretically, have
a common goal just as the business students in the Miner study shared a
clearly defined goal of best resolving the exercise. Other parallels between
the study participants and board members included that the study participants
knew each other before forming groups for the study, presumably had
backgrounds in business and the exercise allowed the participants to pool their
knowledge and evaluate their options in light of their common goal as a board
or committee will do.
75 (same).
38 See Brown, supra note 31, at 175; Manstead, supra note 31, at 274-75.
39 See Brown, supra note 31, at 175.
40 See Frederick C. Miner, Jr., Group Versus Individual Decisionmaking: An Investigation of
Performance Measures, Decision Strategies, and Process Losses/Gains, 33 ORG. BEHAV. &
HUM. PERFORMANCE, 112 (1984); see also Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 17-18.
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As for the best decision-maker aspect of the Miner study findings, it
may be of little practical use because in the real world groups have difficulty
identifying ex ante the best decision-maker in the group. 41 In other words,
although the best individual decision-maker might outperform the average
group, it is likely not possible to identify the best individual before the
decision is made. This difficulty may stem from overconfidence bias,
information asymmetries, collective action problems, status differentials,
social norms and bounded rationality problems.42 Indeed, Miner's study
showed no statistical difference with respect to the ability of groups to pick its
best decision-maker ex ante versus the random chance of such identification.
43
Simply put, groups did no better at picking their best decision-maker before
the fact, than would a disinterested party choosing randomly by flipping a
coin. Given the other findings of the study, this suggests that it is desirable to
have groups make decisions because they perform better than the average
individual does. In addition, by their sheer numbers, groups increase their
chances of having a top performer amongst their members from whom they all
can benefit.
This does not appear to be the only reason groups outperform
individuals. Researcher William L. Faust used a similar technique as
Marquart to analyze the performances of real and statisticized groups who had
a series of spatial and verbal problems to solve. He found that there was little
difference in performance between the real and statisticized groups on the
spatial problems, but that the real groups did better on the verbal problems.
44
Similarly, psychologists Marvin E. Shaw and N. Ashton found that groups
performed as predicted based on individual performance data on simple
crossword puzzles, but on puzzles that are more difficult, they did better than
expected.45 These studies, as well as others, provide evidence that groups can
41 See Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 26-27.
42 See Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 26. The term "bounded rationality," originated by U.S.
Nobel laureate economist Herbert Simon, refers to the concept that all decision-makers make
their decisions under the constraints of limited information, limited cognitive ability to
process and evaluate the available information, and limited time to make the decision. This
concept stands in contrast with the assumption in some models of human behavior in the
social sciences that assumes human rationality. Given the constraints on rational choice,
decision-makers effectively aim to "satisfice" rather than determine the optimal solution,
meaning they will consider alternatives only until one is identified that is satisfactory even
though it may not be the best available alternative. See HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF
MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL - MATHEMATICAL ESSAYS ON RATIONAL HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN
SOCIETY SETTING 204-05 (John Wiley ed., 1957); JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON,
ORGANIZATIONS, 140-41 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1958).
41 See Miner, supra note 40, at 118-2021; see also Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 26.
44 See Brown, supra note 31, at 186 (citing W.L. Faust, Group versus individual problem
solving, 59 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 68-72 (1959)).
45 See id (citing Marvin E. Shaw & N. Ashton, Do assembly bonus effects occur on
Ed. 2]
UC Davis Business Law Journal
exceed the sum of their individual potential when faced with more challenging
cognitive tasks.46 Researchers have observed other factors that lead to group
process gains, such as the importance of the group itself to its members and
prevailing values or cultures that favor collectivism rather than
individualism. 47  In sum, this shows that not only do groups generally
outperform individuals; they also sometimes outperform their collective
potential through group processes. Finally, in addition to the studies
discussed above, other studies have generated results that continue to illustrate
the superiority of group decision-making.
48
disjunctive tasks? A test of Steiner's theory, 8 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC Soc'Y 469-71 (1976)).
46 See id at 185-86, 221.
47 See id at 221.
48 See Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 18 (citing Starr Roxanne Hiltz et al., Experiments in Group
Decision Making: Communication Process and Outcome in Face-to-Face Versus
Computerized Conferences, 13 HuM. Comm. RES. 225, 231 (1986)); see also Larry K.
Michaelsen et al., A Realistic Test of Individual Versus Group Consensus Decision Making,
74 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 834 (1989) (summarizing a study showing that 215 of 222 groups in
the study performed better than their best member); see also Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 24-
25. Notably, one of the study architects, Larry Michaelsen, has roots in team-based work in
both academic and corporate settings. Michaelsen is known as the originator of the idea of
team-based learning in the 1970's. See LARRY K. MICHAELSEN, TEAM-BASED LEARNING: A
TRANSFORMATIVE USE OF SMALL GROUPS vii-viii (Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. 2002).
More recently, economists Alan S. Blinder and John Morgan conducted two laboratory
experiments that again resulted in better performance by groups than individuals. In the first,
individuals and groups of five undergraduates played a game that involved a straightforward
statistical problem-solving game. See Alan S. Blinder & John Morgan, Are Two Heads Better
Than One?: An Experimental Analysis of Group vs. Individual Decisionmaking (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7909, 2000), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7909 (describing the problem and the experiment results); see
also Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 13-14. The study allowed group members to communicate
freely with each other. On average, the groups scored higher than individuals, with the
difference being statistically significant. In a second study, Blinder and Morgan required the
participants to use more expertise and arguably more critical judgment, suggesting that the
study results may carry more weight in the corporate governance context than the first study.
In the second study, students who had taken at least one course in macro economics were
asked to make economic policy decisions posed by a computer model. The study's authors
found that the performance of the best member of the group did not predict group
performance and the groups performed better on average than individuals. These studies
support the view that groups perform better due to synergy or some other effect rather than
simply because groups benefit from their best member.
One additional point is worth noting. For many years, researchers have questioned
whether groups perform decision-making or problem solving tasks more slowly than
individuals. Notably in the Blinder and Morgan study, there was no significant difference in
the speed with which individuals and groups performed. See Blinder, supra, at 13;
Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 14.
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2. Theories on Group Decision-Making Strengths
Scholars in various fields have posited several possible reasons for
superior group decision-making performance, including groups' ability to
correct errors, the averaging function groups may benefit from, groups' ability
to pool memories and skills, and the interaction groups engage in which may
foster useful examination of judgments. 49 To elaborate a bit on these theories,
the first, error correction, refers to the notion that groups seem to be very
effective at rejecting incorrect ideas that individuals might not notice as
incorrect. Groups usually find the correct solution to a problem that has a
demonstrably correct solution, whereas individuals vary more widely in their
ability to do so.
51
Second, groups appear to provide an averaging function of the group
members' choices, which reduces nonsystematic errors in decisions. In
situations where a problem has a solution that group members cannot show is
correct given the information available, group decisions tend to be about as
accurate as the statistical mean of the group members' decisions.52
Researchers have posited that the group averaging function may decrease
inaccuracies that individual members introduce by being unaware of or
ignoring relevant information, as well as alleviate the dilution effect that stems
from irrational reliance on irrelevant information.
53
Third, groups appear to benefit from pooling their members' decision-
making skills, knowledge and memories. 54  The idea is that if a group
effectively marshals the resources of its members and allocates each subtask
to the best member for that task, the group may benefit from a level of
knowledge that approaches the sum of its individual members' knowledge.
The group may perform as well or better than any of its individual members
could because the member best situated to handle each subtask would perform
it.
55
49 See Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 530-34.
50 See Marjorie E. Shaw, A Comparison of Individuals and Small Groups in the Rational
Solution of Complex Problems, 44 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 491, 502 (1932); see also Gayle W. Hill,
Group Versus Individual Performance: Are N+1 Heads Better Than One?, 91 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 517, 533 (1982).
51 See Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 530 & n.237 (citing Daniel Gigone & Reid Hastie, Proper
Analysis of the Accuracy of Group Judgments, 121 PSYCHOL. BULL. 149, 149 (1997); Patrick
R. Laughlin & Alan L. Ellis, Demonstrability and Social Combination Processes on
Mathematical Intellective Tasks, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 177, 184 (1986)).
52 See Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 531 & n.239 (citing Gigone & Hastie, supra note 51).
53 See id at 531 & nn.240-42. The dilution effect is the tendency of people to underutilize
diagnostic evidence in making predictions or decisions when that evidence is accompanied by
irrelevant information.
14 See id at 532 & nn.243-46 (citing Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 21; Hill, supra note 50, at
522 and 525; and Gigone & Hastie, supra note 51, at 160).
" See Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 532-33 (discussing the pooling theory although noting its
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Finally, scholars have posited that discussion between group members
fosters critical evaluation and generates synergy that improves decision-
making. 56 Regardless of which of these theorized reasons holds the most
explanatory power, they illustrate the diverse strengths of groups in the
decision-making context.
B. Corporate Governance Literature and Negotiation Theory on
Group Decision-Making
Legal scholars have examined the question of whether groups generate
better results than individuals do, often applying principles from other
disciplines such as psychology and economics. Particularly applicable here is
corporate law scholarship and negotiation theory.
Corporate law scholars have applied such work to the context of
boards of directors. Perhaps the most extensive work done to date is an article
by Professor Bainbridge that provides an extensive survey of experimental
data suggesting that groups often make better decisions than individuals do,
and observes that the conditions under which groups have outperformed
individuals in laboratory settings have important similarities to the decision-
57making of boards of directors. Bainbridge applied these findings to argue
that the very existence of boards of directors at the top of the corporate
hierarchy follows logically from the evidence on the superiority of group
decision-making.58 Regardless of whether one agrees with his conclusion, his
work expertly synthesizes the data from multiple studies and persuasively
analyzes the context of the studies and their applicability to the board
decision-making scenario. 59
Also applicable is the work of negotiation theorists. When special
committees contain more than one member they are model small groups -
implicitly negotiating the process of decision-making and often explicitly
negotiating key terms of transactions or settlements with others outside the
group. These aspects of special committees make the group decision-making
and negotiation theory literature particularly apt.
To elaborate, where the power to decide is shared among two or more
participants, as is the case on corporate boards and in special committees with
multiple members, decisions must effectively be negotiated. 60 This is not to
imperfections); see also Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 22-24 (discussing studies reporting
groups outperforming individual decision-makers).
56 See Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 534.
57 See Bainbridge, supra note 2.
58 See id
59 The influence of his work can be seen in other literature such as Professor Seidenfeld's
article on cognitive biases and group decision-making in the context of agency rulemaking.
See Seidenfeld, supra note 3.
60 See Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, When Winning Isn't Everything: The Lawyer As Problem
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say that all group decisions are made through explicit negotiation, but rather
that they naturally involve negotiation-style processes. For example, it is only
in rare circumstances that all members of a group agree without discussion on
the way to achieve a complex goal.61 Professor Roger Fisher, widely viewed
as one of the founders of negotiation theory, has described negotiation as
"back-and-forth communication designed to reach an agreement." 62  This
broad description fits the kind of deliberations in which boards and
committees engage when evaluating options and making decisions. Further
highlighting the parallels between decision-making and negotiation, one
psychology scholar has characterized decision-making, without specification
as to whether done individually or in a group, as "a kind of conflict resolution
in which contradictory goals have to be negotiated and reconciled. 63
Moreover, applying negotiation theory is apt because special committees often
handle formal external negotiations, such as negotiating an acquisition
proposal or resolving shareholder litigation. These situations require that the
special committee negotiate with another party, and therefore the question,
whether having more than one member is advantageous to the committee, is
pertinent.
Perhaps most notable for purposes of this Article is the observation
that negotiations between groups, or where at least one side has more than one
participant, often produce agreements that are more valuable.64 Negotiation
Solver, 28 HOFSTRA L. REv. 905, 913-14 (2000) ("Those who study thinking processes-
cognitive and social psychologists and decision scientists-have produced empirical studies
and helpful information about how individuals and groups make decisions, judgment, and
draw conclusions-all of which affect the ability to negotiate with others and solve
problems."); see also Gregory E. Kersten, Support for Group Decisions and Negotiations,
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/DAS/interneg/research/misc/intro gdn.html ("If the power to
decide is shared among two or more participants, then decisions need to be negotiated.")
(emphasis in original).
61 One scholar has made a similar point about group decision-making in the context of
criticizing direct democratic processes. See Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct
Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REv. 434, 463 (1998) ("Group decisionmaking, even when
reduced to a process of preference aggregation, is not merely an exercise in communicating
and adding together individual desires. Rather, it is a process of balancing, blending, and
reconciling sometimes conflicting desires into some sort of minimally coherent whole.").
62 ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN, at xvii (2d ed. 1991).
63 See Ola Svenson, Decision Making and the Search for Fundamental Psychological
Regularities: What Can Be Learned From a Process Perspective?, 65 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 252 (1996). Similarly, multi-group negotiations such as negotiations
between nations, labor and management confrontations, and parliament, have been termed
"intergroup decisionmaking." See Manstead, supra note 31, at 267.
64 See Robert S. Adler and Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with
Power Differentials, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 106 (2000) (noting that research suggests
group or teams produce better agreements not because of power differentials but rather
because team members can find different ways of expanding the total value of the deal); see
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scholars suggest this is due to having additional sources of advice, emotional
support, objectivity, more numerous and fresh ideas to expand value, and an
extra set of eyes and ears in the negotiation process.
6 5
Negotiation scholars have found that being outnumbered or alone is
disadvantageous in most negotiation situations because greater numbers help
in the various activities that take place in seeking an agreement or decision,
such as talking, listening and formulating questions. 66 Scholars claim team
advantages include a better ability to outbargain solos, find creative solutions
to problems, discover more information about the parties' needs and interests,
and even increase the total amount of resources available. Notably, scholars
observe that the benefit of having a team rather than going it alone is not
based on a power differential or intimidation factor stemming from a
difference in numbers. Instead, advantages flow from having more than one
person to aid in the information gathering, explanation and evaluation
processes.67 The logical connection between the observation that groups often
produce more valuable agreements and that it is beneficial to have more than
one person on a negotiation team is that having more than one person on a
special committee will also lead to better decisions and outcomes.
also Anne G. Perkins, Negotiations: Are Two Heads Better Than One?, 71 HARV. Bus.
REV. 13 (1993) (discussing research indicating that two-on-one negotiations often produce
more valuable agreements for both sides than one-on-one negotiations because teams are
better at discerning interests and increasing the overall value of the resources or deal being
negotiated).
65 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 821-22 & n.263 (1984) (citing ROGER FISHER &
WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 94-98
(1981)); see also id at n.255 ("[T]he adage 'two heads are better than one' captures the sense
of synergy accompanying negotiation session which is more problem-solving than
adversarial."). Interestingly, empirical research has also shown that when both parties
approach negotiation with the objective of working in a collaborative rather than adversarial
fashion, they share more information about their needs, which facilitates the search for
solutions. See id. at 821 ("[P]arties may begin with a greater number of possible solutions
simply because two heads are better than one."); see also Adler & Silverstein, supra note 64,
at 106.
66 See John L. Graham & Roy A. Herberger, Jr., Negotiators Abroad: Don't Shoot From the
Hip, 61 HARv. Bus. REV. 160, 162 (1983) (advising that in international negotiations,
business people bargain in teams because "[b]eing outnumbered or, worse, being alone is a
terrible disadvantage in most negotiating situations. Several activities go on at once - talking,
listening, thinking up arguments and making explanations, and formulating questions, as well
as seeking an agreement. Greater numbers help in obvious ways with these.").
67 Also notable is the concept that teams benefited by improving the overall quality of the
negotiations through efforts to expand the pie and fimd creative solutions. See Perkins, supra
note 64, at 14 (discussing a study by Thompson, Brodt, and Peterson finding that teams
outperformed solo negotiators to gain on average 60% of the resources being negotiated, but
that the solos were not worse off because they received as much as they would have received
if they had been negotiating against another solo instead of a team).
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Group decision-making research done to date has not focused on the
specific application to special committees that this Article proposes. The
wealth of research and theory on group decision-making and team negotiation
is nevertheless applicable. Delaware courts have suggested this in recent
cases - underscoring the need for additional study and closer analysis of this
application as well as the potential for new rules or fine-tuning the standards
concerning the size of special committees.
III. RECENT DELAWARE CASE LAW REFLECTING A JUDICIAL PREFERENCE
FOR SPECIAL COMMITTEES WITH MULTIPLE MEMBERS
According to a growing volume of scholarly work, group decision-
making is generally superior to that done by individuals. Noting this
principle, recent Delaware decisions reviewing special committees' decisions
show the court's preference for special committees constituted of more than
one member. This suggests that the Delaware judiciary may be eager to
support a rule that either explicitly encourages this or even requires that
special committees have multiple members.
A. Gesoff v. IIC Industries Inc.
A recent case from Delaware shows that a special committee will be
subject to additional scrutiny when it contains only one member. In Gesoffv.
IIC Industries Inc., CP Holdings made a voluntary tender offer to take private
its publicly traded subsidiary, IIC Industries. 68 In response, the subsidiary
formed a special committee to make a recommendation to its shareholders on
the tender offer. Critically, the committee had only one member.69 The
tender offer failed to put CP Holdings in a position to acquire the remaining
shares by statutory short-form merger. Subsequently, CP Holdings completed
the merger as a statutory long-form merger at the same price that the
subsidiary's special committee recommended in the tender offer. The special
director did not seek a new fairness opinion or undertake any new formalities
on behalf of the minority shareholders after this change in transactional
form.
70
The Delaware Court of Chancery ruled in favor of the plaintiff
shareholders after trial and awarded damages arising from the unfair price
paid. The opinion by Vice Chancellor Stephen Lamb held the merger process
was "marked with grave examples of unfairness, and led to a plainly unfair
price for the going-private transaction." 71 The court noted that the fact that
68 Gesoffv. IIC Indus. Inc., 902 A.2d 1130, 1134 (Del. Ch. 2006).
69 See id at 1137-38.
70 See id at 1142-43.
71 Id. at 1134.
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the committee had only one member was a red flag because, "when a special
committee is comprised of only one director, Delaware courts have required
the sole member, 'like Caesar's wife, to be above reproach."' '72 Further, the
court made clear that Delaware courts "necessarily place[] more trust in a
multiple-member committee than in a committee where a single member
works free of the oversight provided by at least one colleague."
73
The court gave considerable attention to the issue of the one-member
special committee, adding that the case illustrated why a special committee of
one member is "such a worrisome portent of unfair dealing."74 The court
noted:
Although the court acknowledges that no other independent
director was available, and that Simon [the director who
served] was independent of CP, this lone appointment
necessarily causes the court to examine the entire process with
a higher level of scrutiny, and equally causes the court to
require more of Simon than it would had he been joined by
other directors.
75
An additional director "might have ameliorated the process by
counseling Simon to think again, or by making it more difficult for CP to
exert the control it exerted over the special committee. But that moderating
influence was never available." 76  The court also found that the special
committee was uninformed of key information and of the conflicts of interests
of its financial and legal advisers. 77 Indeed, the court's comments call to mind
the theorized reasons for superior group decision-making performance
discussed above, such as error correction, the averaging function a group can
provide, and groups' ability to pool memories and skills, as well as to
72 Id. at 1146. In a footnote, the court explained the historical source of this aphorism was
that it was Caesar's response when asked why he divorced his wife after a false accusation of
adultery. See id at 1146 n.101. The court pointed out that " [s]ince Vice Chancellor Hartnett
first cited Caesar's famous aphorism in Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del. Ch. 1985),
in the context of a special litigation committee, it has been used repeatedly to describe the
responsibilities of directors charged with managing committees of the sort at issue here." Id.
71 Id. at 1146.
74 See id. at 1149. In fact in describing "a well constituted special committee," the court
noted that it should be "independent," "given a clear mandate setting out its powers and
responsibilities in negotiating the interested transaction" and "preferably, hav[e] more than
one member." Id. at 1146.
75 Id. at 1149. The court did not elaborate more precisely on the "higher level of scrutiny"
that it applied, or precisely what more it required of the sole director than it would have had
he been joined by other directors.
76 Id




In sum, the Gesoff case shows judicial recognition of the need for
boards to form special committees with multiple members and to give the
committee a clear mandate and independent authority to handle the matter at
hand. It also shows that courts will scrutinize a special committee's entire
process more rigorously where the committee consists of only one member.
B. In re Tele-Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation
The Delaware Court of Chancery has also more subtly expressed its
preference for multiple-member special committees. As in Gesoff the
Delaware Court of Chancery was critical of the special committee process in
the case In re Tele-Communications, Inc. The court's unpublished
memorandum decision intimated a preference for special committees
containing more than one member.78 The case arose from a merger in which
Tele-Communications, Inc. ("TCI") merged with a subsidiary of AT&T.79
TCI had a capital structure that included two classes of stock with different
voting rights - Series A shares, providing one vote per share, and Series B
shares, providing 10 votes per share. The merger provided a premium price
for TCI's Series B shares. TCI formed a special committee of two directors
during negotiation of the merger to "review any potential transaction," and
decided that it would not recommend that TCI shareholders approve the
transaction without the prior favorable recommendation of the special
80 adtocommittee. In addition, the board chairman recommended that the two
special committee directors be "reasonably compensated" for their work on
the transaction, but no specific compensation was determined.8'
Subsequently, the committee met a few times to discuss the key deal
terms, including a 10 percent premium for the Series B shares. The
committee received advice from the counsel for TCI's investment banker
regarding the committee's fiduciary duties in considering the premium, but
did not retain independent counsel or financial advisers. TCI's investment
banker presented a fairness opinion to the committee that concluded the
transaction was fair to shareholders even though transactions in which high-
voting stock received a premium to low-voting stock were "less common"
than transactions in which all shares were compensated equally.8 2  The
fairness opinion did not, however, specifically assess the fairness of the
transaction's proposed treatment of Series B shareholders vis-a-vis that of
71 See In re Tele-Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 16470, 2005 WL 3642727
(Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2005).
79 See id. at * 1.
80 Id.
81 See id
82 See id at *2.
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Series A shareholders. Both members of the committee voted to approve the
transaction. The same day, the board approved the transaction and it was
subsequently carried out.
Series A shareholders sued TC directors who had voted to approve
the merger transaction, claiming they had breached their fiduciary duties.
Because a majority of the TCI directors held Series B shares and received a
premium, the court subjected the directors' actions to the "entire fairness"
standard of judicial review instead of the more deferential business judgment
rule.8 3 The defendant directors thus had the burden of showing fair dealing
and fair price.
In denying a motion for summary judgment and ordering the
shareholder lawsuit to proceed to trial, the court observed multiple flaws in
the special committee process. Although the court did not specifically take
issue with the number of directors on the special committee, it did criticize the
composition of the committee because it included a director who was not
genuinely disinterested. 4 The director at issue held primarily Series B shares
that would provide him with a premium of $1.4 million. The other director on
the committee held only Series A shares and the court did not take issue with
his membership on the committee. The court questioned, however, why the
committee did not include another director who stood to lose over $13 million
due to the premium paid for the Series B shares.8 5 This comment conveys the
court's preference for multiple-member special committees because the court
did not simply suggest that the director with an interest in the transaction be
removed from the committee, leaving only one member, but rather suggested
that another director should have served in the interested director's place.
Although admittedly a more subtle treatment of the issue than in Gesoff the
Delaware Chancery Court signaled a preference for a special committee of
more than one member.
C. Perlegos v. Atmel Corp.
Another Delaware case, Perlegos v. Atmel Corporation, provides a
useful contrasting example to Gesoff and In re Tele-Communications, Inc.
because it shows the court's less stringent treatment of a case involving a
83 See id at *6-8.
84 The problem of a special committee containing directors who are not genuinely
disinterested arises not infrequently. Perhaps most notably in recent times, the Delaware
Court of Chancery held in In re Oracle Corporation Derivative Litigation, 824 A.2d 917
(Del. Ch. 2003), that the directors constituting a two-member special committee were not
sufficiently independent to assess the merits of a derivative lawsuit on alleged insider trading
by four members of the Oracle board because like the four directors at issue, the special
committee members had strong ties to Stanford University.
85 See In re Tele-Commc'ns, 2005 WL 3642727 at *10.
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special committee of multiple members.86  In Perlegos, the Atmel board
formed a special committee to investigate whether two founders, who were
senior executives of the corporation, had improperly used corporate funds for
personal travel expenses. The special committee consisted of five members.
After conducting its investigation, the special committee unanimously voted
to terminate the employment of the two executives. The fired executives then
filed suit challenging their termination and the independence of the special
committee members. Specifically, the executives claimed that the special
committee's conduct was a pretext to cover the members' true motives, which
included their own promotions, after the company terminated the executives.
The Delaware Court of Chancery rejected the executives' claims and
held that they had failed to rebut the presumption of director disinterestedness
and independence. 87  The court found that the special committee had a
sufficiently broad mandate for its actions and had engaged in a reasonable
process in determining to terminate the executives. 88 Unlike in Gesoff where
the special committee consisted of only one member, here the board consisted
of five members. The court made no mention of any additional scrutiny or
any concerns about any structural weaknesses of the committee. This case
demonstrates an acceptable special committee process and provides a useful
contrasting example to the cases discussed above.
IV. APPLICATION OF THEORY SUPPORTING GROUP DECISION-MAKING TO
SPECIAL COMMITTEES: RECOMMENDATIONS AND POTENTIAL
CONCERNS
Better decisions by special committees will translate into more value
for shareholders and less risk of litigation, which in turn could lead to savings
in time, cost and reputation for the directors and the corporation. Group
decision-making literature and recent case law underscores the potential for
new rules or fine-tuning of the standards concerning the size of special
committees.
A. Recommendations
The law, whether through statute or through the courts, should
86 See Perlegos v. Atmel Corp., No. CIV.A. 2320-N, CIV.A. 2321-N, 2007 WL 475453, *16-
24 (Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 2007).
87 See id. at *20.
88 See id. at *20-24. Specifically, the court noted that the committee sought the advice of
experienced and independent experts and adequately monitored them. In addition, the court
found that the special committee reasonably relied on its counsel's advice to terminate the
executives. The court also noted approvingly that the committee hired two law firms - one to
do the investigation and a separate one to give an independent assessment of the firm's final
report.
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encourage boards to form special committees with more than one member.
Courts should consistently apply higher levels of scrutiny to a special
committee of only one member,8 9 thereby encouraging counsel to advise their
clients of this and to explain the underlying reason that motivates courts to
scrutinize them more closely in the first place. Boards should know that
decisions made by groups tend on average to be superior to those made by
individuals and they should consider this when forming a special committee.
Even when a board forms a special committee with more than one member,
practitioners should closely analyze the independence of each director on the
board, and the personal stake that each board member has in the potential
transaction, when advising their clients in forming a special committee.
Careful analysis in the formative stage of the committee may avoid judicial
criticism of its composition later.
90
Legislatures should encourage or even explicitly require that special
committees be composed of multiple members. The studies, literature, and
Delaware cases discussed above support this proposal by demonstrating that
groups generally outperform individuals at decision-making. In a time when
fiduciary duty law is criticized as serving only a weak monitoring mechanism
for directors, courts and legislatures should place more emphasis on using the
lessons from the social science literature and other disciplines to improve the
structural mechanisms that foster good decision-making and, more broadly,
corporate governance. 91 This proposal is in line with corporate law's
tendency to focus on the board's decision-making process rather than the
substantive decision that comes out of the process, while also aimed at
strengthening the decision-making power of special committees.
92
89 See Gesoff v. IIC Indus. Inc., 902 A.2d 1130, 1146 (Del. Ch. 2006). ("The court
necessarily places more trust in a multiple-member committee than in a committee where a
single member works free of the oversight provided by at least one colleague. But in those
rare circumstances when a special committee is comprised of only one director, Delaware
courts have required the sole member, 'like Caesar's wife, to be above reproach."').
90 See, e.g., In re Tele-Commc'ns, 2005 WL 3642727 at *10 (questioning the composition of
the special committee and noting that the board should have considered including a board
member who personally stood to lose from the proposed transaction as opposed to a board
member who stood to gain from the proposed premium offered to a certain class of
shareholders).
91 Many scholars have argued for more robust fiduciary duty laws in light of recent corporate
scandals. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Wade, Corporate Governance Failures and the Managerial
Duty of Care, 76 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 767, 768 (2002) ("Greater emphasis on standards of care
for both directors and officers is warranted, especially in the aftermath of the corporate
governance failures that scandalized Enron, WorldCom, and other large publicly held
companies."); Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors'
Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 Hous. L. REV. 393, 407-08 (2005) (noting the
erosion of legal liability for directors who breach their duty of care).
92 Corporate law's business judgment rule is a clear example of this focus on process. See In
re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-68 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("The business
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Boards with sufficient independent directors could readily comply
with this proposed rule. It would simply be a matter of using best practices in
forming the special committee. The proposed rule should also apply,
however, where a board does not have a sufficient number of pre-existing
independent board members to form a special committee of two or more
members. This was the situation of the board of directors in Gesoff
When this situation arises, the board can take new outside directors, as
boards commonly do when forming special litigation committees. This would
of course come at a cost, but the additional cost would likely be justified
because boards tend to form special committees when they must make
important decisions and the threat of litigation lurks in the shadows.
Depending on the situation at hand, it could also translate into more value for
shareholders or at least instill more confidence from shareholders whose votes
are needed for a transaction and who could pursue derivative litigation should
they question the quality of the decision.
The additional expense of hiring an expansion director could also be
worthwhile because the additional committee member may ease the burden on
the director who would otherwise have to carry out the special committee
process single-handedly. 93  The committee's responsibility may then be
handled better overall. For example, as the Delaware Chancery Court noted in
Gesoff an additional director could help point out errors or areas that required
further consideration.94  In this same vein, it is widely understood that
directors do not generally devote their full time to serving on the board and
there may be a very real level of impracticality in assigning such a time-
consuming and important task to a single director. 95 In addition, the improved
judgment rule is process oriented"); see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Director's Duty of
Care in Negotiated Dispositions, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 579, 590 (1997) ("The sharp
differentiation between the standards of review of the quality of board decisions on the one
hand, and the decisionmaking process on the other, may be seen as a special case of recurrent
legal tendency to review procedure much more intensively than substance.").
9' Interestingly, research suggests that in some circumstances an individual will work harder
in a group than when working alone. See Manstead, supra note 31, at 278 (citing K.D.
Williams & S.J. Karau, Social Loafing and Social Compensation: The Effects of Expectations
of Co-Worker Performance, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 570, 570-81 (1991)). A
person who worked in a dyad with a less qualified partner on a task that required
interdependent, additive work, worked harder than when working individually. See id. The
effect of compensating for a partner's poor performance is called the "social compensation
effect" or "social laboring" for the greater effort made on group tasks. See id.; see also
Brown, supra note 31, at 183. The two key factors promoting greater effort on group tasks
are the importance of the task and the significance of the group to its members. See Brown,
supra note 31, at 183 (citing S.J. Karau & K.D. Williams, Social loafing: a meta-analytic
review and theoretical integration, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 681-706 (1993)).
94 See Gesoff, 902 A.2d at 1149.
95 Consider as well that underlying the director's substantive decision about the actual matter
at hand is a "meta-choice" or "second-order decision" about the strategy for reducing
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procedure of having more than one member will instill more confidence in the
quality of the decision from courts.
Although independent advisers or counsel often serve a critical
function in assisting the special committee, such advisers are not a substitute
for obtaining an additional special committee member if one is needed to form
a multiple-member committee. Special committees often retain independent
counsel, for example in the context of a management buyout or a parent-
subsidiary merger, internal investigations, and special litigation committees
evaluating shareholder derivative actions.96  Such counsel do not have the
same fiduciary duties as directors, however, and arguably do not have
interests fully aligned with those of the special committee members and the
corporation. Outside counsel of course have reputational concerns and certain
duties to the client, but may be balancing other motivations as well, including
fees and other clients' demands on their time. Further, counsel hired for a
specific task may lack industry knowledge, familiarity with the company and
relationships with the independent directors; proficiencies a new director
would likely have or quickly develop. Moreover, the role of counsel is
inherently advisory. The directors on the committee must ultimately oversee
the work of the outside counsel and make the decisions at hand.
In sum, a rule requiring multiple members on special committees, or at
least clearer standards from courts encouraging this practice, might require
some boards to take new outside directors when forming a special committee.
The additional cost would likely be justified, however, because of the myriad
potential benefits that would flow from such a decision. This is important
even where special committees have hired top-notch advisors and legal
counsel.
One such benefit, apart from the advantages of group decision-making
discussed above, is that the proposed rule might reduce structural bias that
arises when directors evaluate their own colleague's conduct. Structural bias
is specific to the special litigation committee (SLC) context. 97 It has been
problems associated with making the decision. Depending on the situation, the various
strategies the decision-maker chooses to use will vary in the extent they produce suboptimal
decisions and the extent to which they impose burdens on the decision-maker. See Cass
Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions, Ethics 110 (1999). A busy
director tasked with being the sole member of a special committee could seek to reduce the
information and options considered in order to reduce the personal cost of making the
decision, which in turn could increase the chance of suboptimal outcomes. See id at 9 ("It is
largely because people . . . seek to reduce decisional burdens, and to minimize their own
errors, that sometimes they would like not to have options and sometimes not to have
information; and they may make second-order decisions to reduce either options or
information (or both).").
96 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Edward B. Rock, A New Player In The Boardroom: The
Emergence Of The Independent Directors' Counsel, 59 Bus. LAW. 1389, 1390-92 (2004).
97 For a brief discussion of special litigation committees, see supra Part I.
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defined as "inherent prejudice against any derivative action resulting from the
composition and character of the board of directors.,
98
One scholar observed that a mitigating factor of structural bias is a
board member's ability to identify the "salient" 99 group boundary as not one
between the board of directors and the shareholder-plaintiffs - but rather
between the SLC and the rest of the board.100 A board member's "self-
categorization" as part of the special committee would thus mitigate the
collegiality of the committee members with the board as a whole and this
frame of mind could be strengthened by formal structures emphasizing the
distinctiveness of the committee as a group. For example, separate meetings
from the full board, independent budget authority, and autonomy in seeking
advice from counsel and other advisers could emphasize the distinctiveness of
the special committee. 1° 1 Accordingly:
SLC membership might serve as a viable counterweight to the
collegial ties between SLC members and other directors. Many
can recall examples of committees or task forces that have, for
lack of a better word, "gelled," and thus, exhibited a greater
willingness to take on the larger group than would have been
predicted given the dispositions of the individual members. 1
02
This point, with its underpinnings in social psychology, intuitively
makes sense. A one-member special committee cannot feasibly "gel" with
himself,10 3 and a single board member acting alone may have more difficulty
establishing the formal structures separating the committee from the board
that provide for independence and strengthen the member's bond to the
98 Mark A. Underberg, Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against
Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 600, 601 n.14 (1980). In contrast, "[a]ctual bias results from
the self-interested posture of a particular director in relation to a particular derivative claim."
Id This student note was the first to apply the notion of structural bias to challenge the
objectivity of special litigation committees and other commentators quickly began to use the
term. See Davis, supra note 19, at 1307-08.
99 "Salience" is a term used by social psychologists to refer to the question of "within a given
context which, if any, applicable social categorization(s) will most significantly influence
both self perception and impressions formed by others." Penelope Oakes & John C. Turner,
Distinctiveness and the Salience of Social Category Memberships: Is There an Automatic
PerceptualBias Towards Novelty?, 16 EuR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 325, 325 (1986).
100 See Davis, supra note 19, at 1323; see also Robert B. Ahdieh, The Role of Groups in Norm
Transformation: A Dramatic Sketch, In Three Parts, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 231, 253-255 (2005).
101 See Davis, supra note 19, at 1323-34.
102 See id. at 1323.
103 See, e.g., Manstead, supra note 31, at 262 (noting that cohesiveness is one of the most
basic properties of a group, and that "it makes sense to say that a group is cohesive, but not
that an individual is cohesive").
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committee.10 4 Likewise, the appointment of new board members to increase
the committee size would also likely promote the committee's
independence. 105
Finally, in addition to the proposal above, this Article calls for more
targeted primary research on group decision-making in the special committee
context. As noted, the decision-making tasks and group processes that
researchers have studied to date are analogous to decision-making in various
contexts, including special committees. The long history of study results
showing better decision-making performance by groups than individuals
should also be recognized. Nonetheless, it is natural that critics may be
skeptical of whether experimental data gathered from a laboratory setting
offers insight or explanatory power in the real world. 10 6 Targeted empirical
work for special committee design would help answer any such potential
concerns and bolster efforts to provide reliable prescriptions for improving
special committee decision-making. 10 7  Such research could also provide
further insights on issues such as mitigating group cognitive biases that might
arise in special committees.
This research may be difficult to execute because studying the
complex decisions special committees make is not easily done in a laboratory
setting and real-world outcomes may not be easily evaluated or ranked against
results that did not materialize or results from a different factual scenario.
Conducting research with interactive groups is time consuming, costly, and
the resulting data may be hard to understand or explain.' 8 Likewise,
analyzing anecdotal evidence may be of limited utility because it may not give
a full picture and critical evaluation of decision quality would be difficult.
104 See Brown, supra note 31, at 189-90 (discussing studies showing the importance of social
identity for performance).
105 See Davis, supra note 19, at 1324 ("For these new appointees, most of their sense of
themselves as board members will be tied up in their common experience serving on the
SLC."). Dean Davis also points out, however, that the consequence of appointing new
outside directors, often called "expansion directors," is that it opens the door to selection bias.
He notes that "the case law to date has not directly confronted this tension between
collegiality and selection bias as such." He argues that expansion directors "should be treated
as no more independent than the incumbents who appointed them," and proposes that courts
should place less emphasis on the independence of the SLC members and more emphasis on
the merits of their substantive decision. See id. at 1359-60.
106 See Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 14-15; see also Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 490.
107 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Structural Lawmaking to Reduce Cognitive
Bias: A Critical View, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 616 (2002) (recognizing cognitive psychology as
a useful critical theory to supplement our understanding of various institutional interactions
and processes of policy debate and deliberation, but expressing skepticism about attempts to
use cognitive psychology to support a specific institutional design or role without an adequate
empirical basis).




Nevertheless, this is an area that merits further laboratory or empirical
research, even with its limitations, for the reasons listed above, and more
fundamentally, because of the importance of special committees and boards
within corporations, the pillars of our economy.
The study of group decision-making and negotiation is becoming a
recognizable field of study in its own right and could also be an avenue for
new research applicable in the special committee context. Its roots are
incredibly multidisciplinary, with researchers from organizational behavior,
psychology, operations research, and other disciplines. 10 9 Scholars in the field
have noted that in developing analytical methods and support tools, social and
behavioral theories must be considered more consistently and deeply." l0 This
shows a commitment in the field to considering multiple perspectives,
including organization theory, cultural aspects, small group theory, political
science and management theory, which will deepen the level of research and
analysis in the area. Research on methods and models of group decision and
negotiations processes could provide useful data to apply to special
committees."'l
B. Potential Concerns and Responses
Criticism of a law requiring that special committees consist of more
than one member is likely to center around the cognitive biases that can affect
group decision-making. Further, the proposal could be interpreted as contrary
to the recent trend of small corporate boards. The proposal set forth in this
Article withstands these potential concerns.
1. Cognitive Biases
As to the first potential concern, cognitive biases do not appear to push
conclusively for or against the use of groups to make decisions. Some
background on cognitive biases is first necessary to explore this response.
'09 See Susan E. Brodt, Innovative Approaches to Research on Group Decision and
Negotiation, GROUP DECISION AND NEGOTIATION 6:283-287 (1997).
110 See Gregory E. Kersten, Support for Group Decisions and Negotiations,
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/DAS/interneg/research/misc/intro gdn.html. This overview
notes that research on group decisions and negotiation is usually published in general journals
in the fields of management sciences, operations research and information systems, often with
dedicated special issues (for example, Annals of Operations Research, Control and
Cybernetics, Decision Support Systems, EJOR, Management Sciences, Theory and
Decisions), area-specific journals such as Group Decision and Negotiation and Negotiation
Journal, and edited books. Other sources include research on negotiation modeling and
negotiation support systems (often referred to as "NSS"), multi-criteria decision-making
("MCDM") approaches to group support, and group decision support systems ("GDSS").
1 For a sampling of work from leading researchers in the various areas making up this field
of study, see Fisher and Ury, 1983; Zartman, 1994; Kremenuk, 1991; Pruit, 1991; Lax and
Sebenius, 1986.
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Psychology scholars have observed that when individuals make
decisions they often do not act in the rational, optimizing fashion that
economists assume or have previously assumed. Instead, individuals are
susceptible to making cognitive errors that result in predictable biases.
Individuals tend to use decision-making shortcuts or simplifications without
evaluating whether they are maximizing the net benefits of their decision.
These shortcuts and simplifications allow the decision-maker to rely on his or
her experience or expertise to predictably resolve the issue rather than devote
resources to fully and optimally consider the decision in light of all of the
relevant information. 112 In addition to finding that individuals do not always
act in a perfectly rational and optimizing fashion, psychology scholars have
also theorized and studied many patterns of deviations in judgment that have
come to be generally known as cognitive biases.
Cognitive biases specific to group interaction may negatively affect
group decision-making. These biases include group polarization, group
confirmation bias, inadequate reporting and use of shared information, and
groupthink.113 Because these group cognitive biases could affect multiple-
member special committees, they also merit a brief explanation.
Group polarization refers to people's tendency to make more extreme
judgments or to prefer more conservative or riskier courses of action when
they are in a group rather than when making the decisions alone.
114
Researchers believe this leads to greater variability in group decisions.
115
Group confirmation bias refers to a group's tendency to seek new information
or interpret new information in a way that supports or confirms previously
112 See Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 491-94 & nn.22-23 (2002) (describing the decision-
making shortcuts or simplifications that decision-makers use as a "decisionmaking rule,"
meaning "the use of predetermined categories into which a person places factual
circumstances to derive an outcome."); see also SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 107-88 (McGraw Hill 1993); HEURISTICS AND BIASES:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2002); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman
et al. eds, Cambridge Univ. Press 1982).
113 These concepts come from cognitive psychology research and theory. Professor
Seidenfeld's work, cited above, discussed these concepts in the context of his thesis that "the
psychology of individual decisionmaking biases and group decisionmaking dynamics
suggests that judicial review does improve the overall quality of rules." See Seidenfeld, supra
note 3, at 489. Other scholars have discussed these concepts in a range of contexts. See, e.g.,
Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 107, at 623, n.24. (raising the issue of group cognitive
limitations in the context of groups of public-regarding public servants).
114 See Moscovici, S., & Zavalloni, M., The Group As A Polarizer of Attitudes, J. OF
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 12, 125-135 (1969); see also Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at
535. This phenomenon was called "risky shift," but as research showed that the group
tendency towards extremes can be toward risk or caution, the more precise term "group
polarization" took hold. See Manstead, supra note 31, at 266.
115 See Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 536 & n.269.
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held beliefs and to avoid information or interpretations that would contradict
those beliefs."l 6 Groups also tend to consider shared information more than
unshared information, and unshared information tends to be inadequately
reported and underutilized. Finally, groupthink is "[a] mode of thinking that
people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when
the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically
appraise alternative courses of action."117  Clearly, if actualized, these
cognitive biases have the potential to work against groups seeking to make
optimal decisions. The important question is thus how serious of a concern
they actually present.
Unfortunately, the effect of cognitive biases is inconclusive because
researchers have not quantified the effect of group cognitive biases generally,
much less in the particular context of special committees. 118  Indeed,
determining the exact effect of group cognitive biases in various
circumstances may be an unattainable goal given the nature of the subject.
Further, researchers have not established as a general matter that groups tend
to suffer more (or less) than individuals from the effects of cognitive biases in
decision-making. 119  Thus the research on cognitive biases does not
116 See Dieter Frey, Recent Research on Selective Exposure to Information, in 19 ADVANCES
IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 41 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1986); see also
Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 535, 538-9.
117 JANIS, IRVING L., VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK 9 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1972).
118 Concern about polarization, at least, seems somewhat overstated in the literature. Almost
all studies on which conclusions about polarization have been made were conducted in
laboratory settings with ad hoc groups in which the outcome was hypothetical. See Brown,
supra note 31, at 199-200. Researchers rarely gain access to real decision-making groups for
observational field study, but studies under such real circumstances have generally not shown
polarization. See id. (citing G. Semin & A.I. Glendon, Polarization and the established
group, 42 BRIT. J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 281-91 (1971)). Cutting against this is a study
of federal judges' decisions that showed that a significantly greater percentage of cases heard
by a panel of three judges, as opposed to a single judge, could be classified as libertarian. See
id. (citing T.G. Walker & E.C. Main, Choice shifts in political decision making: federal
judges and civil liberties cases, 3 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 39-48 (1973)). One persuasive
explanation is that unlike ad hoc laboratory groups, real decision-making groups usually have
qualities that might inhibit polarization such as a longer term existence, an internal structure
such as designated officers, conventional procedures such as written agendas, and established
norms about the subject matter. See id. Judicial panels that convene for just one case or a
cluster of cases are more analogous to the ad hoc laboratory groups in that they usually come
together just for that discrete task and then disband. See id. Special committees, depending
on their mandate and the circumstances, may fall somewhere in between on this spectrum.
119 See Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias, and Context, 29 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2557, n.103 (2008) (citing N. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and
Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 657, 713 (1996), for the proposition that "there is no simple
empirical answer to whether groups or individuals are likely to make biased judgments.").
For information on individual biases, see JOHNATHAN BARON, TH[NKING AND DECIDING
(Cambridge Univ. Press 3d. ed. 2000); THOMAS GILOVICH, How WE KNOW WHAT ISN'T SO:
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conclusively weigh in favor or against the use of groups to make decisions.
Perhaps the most that can be said on the topic without further critical
study is that members of groups should become aware of the cognitive biases
they may be susceptible to and take steps to mitigate these biases. Professor
Cass Sunstein has provided the following advice:
[S]tructure deliberation so as to increase the likelihood that
relevant information will emerge. A norm in favor of
critical thinking, and incentives to reward individuals for
good decisions by groups, can overcome some of the
relevant pressures. Leaders should take steps to encourage
a wide range of views; to do this, leaders might be cautious
about expressing their own views at the outset and should
encourage reasons, rather than conclusions, before the
views of group members start to harden. 
120
Similarly, social psychology literature supports a facilitative leadership
style that maximizes effective participation of all group members to draw out
relevant ideas, information, alternative viewpoints and criticism.121 Research
has shown that groups can improve their outcomes by taking time at the start
of their discussion to plan how they will proceed. They should also reflect on
common group decision-making perils, such as inadequate information
sharing, groupthink, etc. 122 Those who wish to minimize exposure to group
cognitive biases could further explore the extensive literature on this topic for
additional insights. 123
2. Trend Toward Smaller Board Size
Another potential concern with respect to requiring special committees
to consist of more than one member is that this idea may run counter to recent
literature proposing smaller board size. The recommendation, however, does
TIE FALLIBILITY OF HUMAN REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE (The Free Press 1993); HEURISTICS
AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2002); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1982).
120 Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information
Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 1048 (2005).
121 See Brown, supra note 31, at 217-21.
122 See id.
123 See, e.g., Turner, M.E. & Pratkanis, A.R., Mitigating Groupthink by Stimulating
Constructive Conflict, in Carsten K.W. De Dreu & Evert Van de Vliert (Eds.), USING
CONFLICT IN ORGANIZATIONS 53-71 (Sage Publications Ltd. 1997); see also Marleen A.




not conflict with the views expressed in that literature. The explanation is
quite straightforward.
The recent literature championing smaller boards addresses the
collective action problem that boards of directors face in carrying out their
duties. 124 Some commentators link the collective action problem to the size of
boards and have suggested that firms should reduce their board size. 125 The
underlying notion for this recommendation is the theory that board size
negatively correlates with firm performance because the larger the board, the
less an individual director perceives he will take the blame for poor
performance and so will monitor the executives less. 126 In addition, scholars
have noted that coordination becomes more difficult with larger boards and
thus costs are increased.
127
124 See, e.g., Kay Xixi Ng, Inside the Boardroom: A Proposal to Delaware's Good Faith
Jurisprudence to Improve Board Passivity, 6 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 393, 402-05 (2008).
The collective action problem translates into passive boards that do not truly serve the
monitoring function over the executives that they are theorized to serve. See, e.g., Charles M.
Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and Corporate Governance Reform, 38
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855, 857 (2003) ("Yet, despite this legal expectation for active
monitoring, the reality is that boards of directors in many instances have become reasonably
unimportant and impotent entities-mere 'parsley on the corporate fish."'); see also
Bainbridge supra note 2, at 8-9 (discussing trends in literature encouraging more active board
oversight). According to these commentators, the ratio of what a director perceives to get
from his monitoring efforts is often slight in contrast to his perceived cost for doing it - the
director may improve his reputation or benefit from an increase in stock price when
monitoring improves the firm's performance, but the cost of his time and the potential social
disruption of such monitoring could be significant. Further, even though directors are
officially elected by the shareholders, directors may believe that they owe their jobs to the
executives because it is common for executives to choose the board candidates and the
shareholders simply ratify the selection. See Ng, supra, at 394; see also Benjamin E.
Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their
Monitoring of the CEO, 88 AM. EcoN. REv. 96, 96 (1998). Directors may not want to appear
aggressive or untrusting of the executives because of worry that it could cost them their board
position and their chances for obtaining other board positions. In addition, directors may not
perceive any problems with the management without doing further investigation. The
incentive structure for directors doing this investigation is generally inadequate because
directors only work part time in their positions and usually do not get paid for additional time
spent outside of meetings and special committee participation. See id at 403; see also Martin
Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance, 48 Bus.
LAW. 59, 64 (1992).
125 See Ng, supra note 124, at 402; see also Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard S. Black, The Uncertain
Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. LAW. 921, 941-42
(1999); Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 124, at 65; Theodore Eisenberg, Stefan Sundgren, &
Martin T. Wells, Larger Board Size and Decreasing Firm Value in Small Firms, 48 J. FIN.
ECON. 35 (1998).
126 See Ng, supra note 124, at 402.
127 See Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 124, at 65; Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 6-7 (discussing
how hierarchy constrains agency costs within the firm).
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This Article's proposal to require special committees to contain more
than one member is not inconsistent with the position of scholars who have
lamented board passivity and those who have recommended that firms reduce
their board size. This is because although group decision-making theory
suggests that groups generally make better decisions than individuals do, the
focus of this work has not been on any particular group size. There is nothing
to suggest that a firm cannot minimize the collective action problem by
avoiding a large board while still forming special committees that contain
more than one member. 128  Moreover, boards generally form special
committees for a specific purpose, such as in response to shareholder litigation
or for a strategic transaction. The theorized board passivity and coordination
problems may be much less of an issue for special committees, if at all,
because of their narrower purpose and smaller size than a full board, even
with multiple members.
V. CONCLUSION
Special committees make some of the most important decisions facing
corporations; decision-making is central to special committees' purpose.
Sometimes a board will create a special committee of just one person to
handle a crucial matter. Research shows, however, that groups tend to make
better decisions than individuals do. Negotiation theory further bolsters a
preference for group decision-making. Recently, Delaware courts have noted
some of the empirical and scholarly work on group decision-making and have
recognized the advantages of having multiple members on special committees.
This Article proposes that courts or legislatures firmly establish a
preference or requirement that special committees consist of more than one
member. This will improve the structural mechanisms that foster good
decision-making in special committees and, more broadly, better corporate
governance. Even in the absence of a formal change in corporate law on this
matter, boards as a practical matter should only form special committees with
multiple members. Lawyers should counsel their clients of the same. This is
the best practice in light of the research and negotiation theory suggesting this
will improve committees' decisions, as well as Delaware courts' preference
for this practice. Finally, this Article also calls for more targeted primary
research on group decision-making in the special committee context.
128 No significant experimental research has been done on whether there is an optimal board
size. See Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 42.
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